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COMING	  OF	  AGE	  IN	  IP:	  	  
WHAT	  GOODS,	  INFRASTRUCTURES,	  AND	  PROPERTY	  
THEORY	  SUGGEST	  ABOUT	  	  
THE	  FLOURISHING	  OF	  	  
INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  SCHOLARSHIP	  
Zahr	  K.	  Said	  *	  
RONALD	  A.	   CASS	  &	  KEITH	  N.	   HYLTON,	   LAWS	   OF	   CREATION:	   PROPERTY	   RIGHTS	   IN	   THE	  WORLD	  OF	  IDEAS	  (2013).	  Pp.	  288.	  Hardcover	  $55.00.	  	  MADHAVI	  SUNDER,	  FROM	  GOODS	  TO	  A	  GOOD	  LIFE:	  INTELLECTUAL	  PROPERTY	  AND	  GLOBAL	  JUSTICE	  (2012).	  Pp.	  272.	  Hardcover	  $35.00.	  	  BRETT	  M.	   FRISCHMANN,	   INFRASTRUCTURE:	   THE	   SOCIAL	   VALUE	   OF	   SHARED	  RESOURCES	  (2012).	  Pp.	  436.	  Hardcover	  $85.00.	  	  The	   field	  of	   intellectual	  property	  (“IP”)	  scholarship	   is	  a	  comparatively	  young	  one,	  when	  juxtaposed	  with	  fields	  of	   law	  like	  contracts,	  property,	  or	  even	  torts	  and	  unfair	   competition.	   Those	   older	   areas	   of	   law,	   especially	   property,	   possess	   distin-­‐guished	  jurisprudential	  histories,	  with	  hundreds	  of	  years—millennia,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  property—of	  erudition	  informing	  them.	  Those	  older	  areas	  of	  law	  originally	  provid-­‐ed	  some	  basis	  for	  IP	  laws,	  and	  different	  areas	  of	  IP	  reflect	  these	  different	  doctrinal	  origins.	  It follows that IP law has a much shorter scholarly history than its predecessor 
doctrines. Despite the origins of IP legislation in the Enlightenment and in the founding 
of the Republic, a full body of scholarship in the area was slow to germinate, and argua-
bly slower still to mature.1	  Full	  consideration	  of	  the	  pace,	  emergence,	  and	  evolution	  of	  IP	  scholarship	  is	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  review.2	  Yet	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  rap-­‐id	  growth	  and	  increasing	  centrality	  of	  IP	  to	  the	  global	  economy	  has	  led	  to	  more	  law	  
                                                            	   *	   Assistant	   Professor	   of	   Law,	   University	   of	   Washington	   School	   of	   Law.	   Special	   thanks	   to	   Laura	  Heymann,	  Barton	  Beebe,	  Ryan	  Calo,	  Lisa	  Manheim,	  MJ	  Durkee,	  Anna	  Brickhouse,	  and	  Andrew	  Stauffer,	  for	  helpful	  comments	  on	  an	  earlier	  draft.	  	  	   1.	  	   Edward	  C.	  Walterscheid,	  To	  Promote	  The	  Progress	  Of	  Science	  And	  Useful	  Arts:	  The	  Background	  And	  
Origin	  Of	  The	  Intellectual	  Property	  Clause	  Of	  The	  United	  States	  Constitution,	  J.	  OF	  INT.	  PROP.	  L.	  2,	  16	  (1994).	  	   2.	  	   Partial	  explanation	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  intellectual	  property	  laws	  did	  not	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  for	  earlier	  generations.	  In	  the	  contemporary	  “knowledge	  economy,”	  by	  contrast,	  in-­‐tellectual	  property	  protection	  has	  a	  crucial	  place.	  Greater	  attention	  to	   its	  structure	  and	  purpose	   in	  our	  era,	   as	  well	   as	   greater	  awareness	  of	   its	   limitations,	   seem	   thus	  unsurprising.	  Combined	  with	   the	  emer-­‐gence	  of	  a	  greater	  diversity	  of	  academic	  work	  in	  law,	  and	  a	  substantial	  increase	  in	  volume	  of	  scholarship	  and	  greater	  specificity	  in	  topic,	  it	  seems	  historically	  inevitable,	  perhaps,	  that	  intellectual	  property	  would	  emerge	  as	  a	  field	  of	  inquiry	  in	  its	  own	  right.	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being	  made,	   more	   IP	   lawyers	   needed	   to	   interpret	   and	   police	   that	   law,	   and	  more	  scholarly	  interest	  as	  a	  function	  of	  all	  that	  legal	  growth.3	  In	  recent	  decades,	  IP	  scholarship	  has	  witnessed	  a	  crescendo.	  One	  could	  decry	  the	  noise,	  conceding	  one’s	  own	  lack	  of	  perfect	  pitch	  of	  course,	  but	  I	  prefer	  to	  cele-­‐brate	  the	  symphony,	  however	  haphazard,	  and	  take	  the	  cacophony	  along	  with	  it.	  By	  contrast,	   by	   the	   mid	   nineteenth-­‐century,	   little	   scholarly	   sound	   as	   we	   conceive	   it	  would	  have	  been	  available	  to	  greet	  the	  ear.	  In	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  writings	  on	  IP	  tended	  to	  be	  summaries	  or	  treatises,	  though	  this	  was	  true	  of	  American	  law	  in	  general	  in	  this	  era.4	  Starting	  in	  the	  fin-­‐de-­‐siècle	  and	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  howev-­‐er,	  certain	  works	  of	  scholarship	  emerged	  that	  are	  arguably	  classic	  works	  of	  IP	  law	  and	  theory	  today.5	  Their	  existence	  indicates	  that	  there	  was	  scholarship	  in	  this	  field	  of	  the	  sort	  we	  consider	  scholarship	  today.	  There	  was,	  in	  fact,	  a	  field;	  and	  some	  of	  its	  scholarship	  was	   very	   good.	   It	   helped	   shape	   contemporary	   academic	   discourse	   as	  well	  as	  today’s	  IP	  laws	  themselves.	  Scholarship	  in	  particular	  from	  around	  the	  1930s	  and	   1940s	   (especially	   in	   trademark),6	   the	   1950s	   (especially	   in	   patent),7	   and	   the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  (especially	  in	  copyright),	  produced	  many	  lasting	  gems.8	  Nonethe-­‐less,	  IP	  scholarship	  has	  greatly	  increased	  in	  volume	  and—happily—in	  diversity	  and	  sophistication,	  too,	  as	  a	  function	  of	  many	  factors.	  These	  factors	  likely	  include	  the	  in-­‐crease	   in	   the	   size	   of	   the	   professoriate,	   the	   growth	   and	   codification	   of	   the	   IP	   laws	  themselves,	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   IP	   as	   a	   central	   component—if	   not	   the	   central	  
                                                            	   3.	  	   William	  Fisher,	  Theories	  of	  Intellectual	  Property,	  in	  NEW	  ESSAYS	  IN	  THE	  LEGAL	  AND	  POLITICAL	  THEORY	  OF	  PROPERTY	  168	  (Stephen	  R.	  Munzer	  ed.,	  2001).	  	  	   4.	  	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   Justice	   Story’s	   treatises,	  which	   Grant	   Gilmore	   calls	   “works	   of	   impressive	  scholarship	  and	  of	  great	  originality,”	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  largely	  workman-­‐like,	  but	  not	  deeply	  intellectual.	  GRANT	  GILMORE,	  THE	  AGES	  OF	  AMERICAN	  LAW	  28	  (1977).	  “The	  books	  were	  conceived	  as	  manuals	  for	  practitioners	  and	  were	  mostly	  uncritical	  collections	  of	  case	  digests	  .	  .	  .	  .	  It	  was	  a	  literature	  which,	  apart	  from	  such	  exceptional	  accomplishments	  as	  [Justice]	  Story’s,	  had	  no	  jurispruden-­‐tial	   pretensions	   whatever.”	   Id.	   at	   29.	   For	   examples	   of	   such	   treatises,	   see	   GEORGE	   TICKNOR	   CURTIS,	   A	  TREATISE	   ON	   THE	   LAW	   OF	   COPYRIGHT	   (1847);	   EATON	   S.	   DRONE,	   A	   TREATISE	   ON	   THE	   LAW	   OF	   PROPERTY	   IN	  INTELLECTUAL	  PRODUCTIONS	  IN	  GREAT	  BRITAIN	  AND	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  (1879);	  ALBERT	  H.	  WALKER,	  TEXT-­‐BOOK	  OF	  THE	  PATENT	  LAWS	  OF	  THE	  UNITED	  STATES	  OF	  AMERICA	  (1883).	  	  	   5.	  	   For	   a	  wonderful	   resource	  assembling	  many	  of	   the	   field’s	   earliest	   treatises	   and	  works,	   see	  Mike	  Madison,	   Lost	   Classics	   of	   Intellectual	   Property	   Law:	   1	   of	   4,	   MADISONIAN.NET	   (Jan.	   1,	   2010),	  http://madisonian.net/2010/01/01/lost-­‐classics-­‐of-­‐intellectual-­‐property-­‐law-­‐1-­‐of-­‐4/.	   The	   first	   part	   of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  saw	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  legal	  treatise,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  works	  Madison	  cites	  from	  that	  era	  are	  indeed	  more	  like	  treatises	  than	  like	  the	  scholarship	  model	  we	  consider	  to	  be	  pathclearing	  today.	  	   6.	  	   See,	   e.g.,	  RUDOLF	   CALLMANN,	   THE	   LAW	   OF	   UNFAIR	   COMPETITION	   AND	   TRADE-­‐MARKS	   (1945);	   Ralph	   S.	  Brown,	   Jr.,	   Advertising	   and	   the	   Public	   Interest:	   Legal	   Protection	   of	   Trade	   Symbols,	   57	   YALE	   L.J.	   1165	  (1948);	  Felix	  Cohen,	  Transcendental	  Nonsense	  and	  the	  Functional	  Approach,	  35	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	  809	  (1935);	  Milton	  Handler	  &	  Charles	  Pickett,	  Trade-­‐Marks	  and	  Trade	  Names—An	  Analysis	  and	  Synthesis,	  30	  COLUM.	  L.	  REV.	   168	   (1930);	   Beverly	   W.	   Pattishall,	   Trade-­‐Marks	   and	   the	   Monopoly	   Phobia,	   50	   MICH.	   L.	   REV.	   967	  (1952);	  Frank	  I.	  Schechter,	  The	  Rational	  Basis	  of	  Trademark	  Protection,	  40	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  813	  (1927).	  	   7.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  HARRY	  A.	  TOULMIN,	  INVENTION	  AND	  THE	  LAW	  (1936);	  Fritz	  Machlup	  &	  Edith	  Penrose,	  The	  Pa-­‐
tent	  Controversy	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century,	  10	  J.	  ECON.	  HIST.	  1	  (1950);	  Arnold	  Plant,	  The	  Economic	  Theory	  
Concerning	   Patents	   for	   Inventions,	   1	   ECONOMICA	   30	   (1934);	   Giles	   S.	   Rich,	  The	   Relation	   Between	   Patent	  
Practices	  and	  the	  Anti-­‐Monopoly	  Laws,	  24	  J.	  PATENT	  OFF.	  SOC’Y	  85	  (1942);	  Fritz	  Machlup,	  An	  Economic	  Re-­‐
view	  of	  the	  Patent	  System,	  S.	  COMM.	  ON	  THE	  JUDICIARY,	  85TH	  CONG.,	  STUDY	  NO.	  15	  (Comm.	  Print	  1958).	  	   8.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  BENJAMIN	  KAPLAN,	  AN	  UNHURRIED	  VIEW	  OF	  COPYRIGHT	  (1967);	  Melville	  B.	  Nimmer,	  Two	  Copy-­‐
right	  Crises,	  Foreword	   in	  NEW	  TECHNOLOGY	  AND	  THE	  LAW	  OF	  COPYRIGHT,	  REPROGRAPHY	  AND	  COMPUTERS,	   15	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  931	  (1968);	  L.	  RAY	  PATTERSON,	  COPYRIGHT	  IN	  HISTORICAL	  PERSPECTIVE	  (1968);	  Robert	  M.	  Hurt	  &	  Robert	  M.	   Schuchman,	  The	  Economic	  Rationale	   of	   Copyright,	   56	  AM.	  ECON.	  REV.	   421	   (1966);	  Melville	  B.	  Nimmer,	  Copyright	   vs.	   The	  First	  Amendment,	   17	  BULL.	   COPYRIGHT	  SOC’Y	  U.S.A.	  255	   (1970);	  Arnold	  Plant,	  
The	  Economic	  Aspects	  of	  Copyright	  in	  Books,	  1	  ECONOMICA	  167	  (1934);	  Martin	  A.	  Roeder,	  The	  Doctrine	  of	  
Moral	  Rights,	  53	  HARV.	  L.	  REV.	  554	  (1940);	  Leon	  Yankwich,	  What	  is	  Fair	  Use?,	  22	  U.	  CHI.	  L.	  REV.	  203	  (1954).	  
2
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component—in	  today’s	  “knowledge	  economy.”9	  It	  is	  therefore	  heartening	  to	  see,	  re-­‐flected	  in	  the	  range	  and	  depth	  of	  the	  three	  books	  selected	  for	  this	  review,	  that	  the	  field	  of	  IP	  scholarship	  has,	  to	  borrow	  from	  Margaret	  Mead,	  genuinely	  come	  of	  age.10	  The	   three	  books	  selected	   for	   this	   review	  collectively	  put	   to	   rest	  any	  doubts	  about	  the	  field’s	  intellectual	  and	  methodological	  maturity,	  if	  any	  doubts	  could	  be	  said	  still	  to	   exist.	   IP	   scholarship	   now	   flourishes	   in	   a	   non-­‐uniform,	   rigorous,	   ever-­‐evolving,	  methodologically	  rich	  and	  polyglottal	  way.	  In	  their	  book,	  Laws	  of	  Creation:	  Property	  Rights	   in	  the	  World	  of	   Ideas,	  Ronald	  Cass	   and	  Keith	  Hylton	   approach	   IP	   through	   an	   economic	   lens,	   seeking	   to	   counter	  what	   they	   perceive	   to	   be	   a	   normative	   bias	   against	   property	   rights	   in	   IP	   scholar-­‐ship.11	   This	   bias	   could	   be	   described	   as	   anti-­‐expansionist	   since	   it	   decries	   the	   per-­‐ceived	   expansion	   of	   IP	   rights.	   Investigating	   canonical	   texts	   from	   philosophy,	   eco-­‐nomic	   theory,	   and	   property,	   Cass	   and	   Hylton	   offer	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   anti-­‐expansionists	   and	   a	   justification	   for	   those	  willing	   to	   consider	   the	   opposing	   view,	  namely,	  that	  the	  expansion	  of	  IP	  rights,	  which	  they	  concede	  has	  occurred,	  may	  not	  be	  cause	  for	  concern.	  In	  From	  Goods	  to	  a	  Good	  Life:	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Global	  Justice,	  Madhavi	  Sunder	  writes	  to	  provide	  an	  alternative	  narrative	  to	  counter	  some	  of	  the	  weight	  of	  economic	  theories	  of	  intellectual	  property’s	  creation,	  consumption,	  and	  protection.	  Conjuring	  a	  notion	  of	   IP	  as	  participatory	  culture,	   she	   insists	  on	  a	   consequentialist	  vision	  of	  IP	  in	  which	  global	  justice	  can	  and	  should	  be	  expressly	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  of	  IP’s	  highest	  ends.12	  Brett	  Frischmann’s	  book,	  Infrastructure:	  The	  Social	  Value	  of	  Shared	  Resources,	  represents	  not	  a	  middle	  ground	  so	  much	  as	  a	  third	  way.	  Using	  and	  critiquing	  eco-­‐nomic	   theory.	   Frischmann	   innovatively	   connects	   the	   interdisciplinary	   concepts	   of	  “infrastructure”	   and	   “the	   commons,”	   emphasizing	  demand-­‐side	  microeconomics.13	  He	   shows	   how	   infrastructures	   underpin	   and	   shape	   many	   resources,	   including,	  somewhat	  counterintuitively,	  not	  just	  internet	  usage	  but	  also	  IP.	  His	  work,	  like	  Sun-­‐der’s,	  is	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  economic	  vision,	  but	  unlike	  hers,	  which	  is	  largely	  an	  exter-­‐nal	  one,	  Frischmann’s	  mobilizes	  economics	  from	  an	  internal	  perspective,	  at	  the	  con-­‐fluence	  of	  regulatory	  economics	  and	  public	  welfare	  economics.	  By	  attending	  to	  the	  role	   and	   importance	   of	   infrastructures,	   in	   light	   of	   theories	   of	   commons	  manage-­‐ment,	  he	  arrives	  at	  a	  normative	  vision	  of	  nondiscrimination	  that	  urges	  scholars	  to	  “move	  beyond	  the	  impoverished	  [simplistic]	  view	  of	   infrastructure	  .	  .	  .	  and	  grapple	  with	   the	   functional	   relationships	   between	   infrastructure	   and	   interdependent	   sys-­‐tems.”14	  Key	  to	  both	  Frischmann	  and	  Sunder,	  however	  different	  their	  books	  may	  be,	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  frustration	  with	  the	  limits	  of	  economic	  models,	  whatever	  their	  very	  re-­‐al	  benefits	  may	  have	  been,	  and	  may	  continue	  to	  be.	  Both	  scholars	  show	  themselves	  
                                                            	   9.	  	   Walter	  W.	   Powell	   &	   Kaisa	   Snellman,	   The	   Knowledge	   Economy,	   30	   ANN.	   REV.	   SOC.	   200-­‐201,	   203	  (2004).	  	  	   10.	  	   See	  MARGARET	  MEAD,	  COMING	  OF	  AGE	  IN	  SAMOA	  (1928).	  	   11.	  	   See	  RONALD	  A.	  CASS	  &	  KEITH	  N.	  HYLTON,	  LAWS	  OF	  CREATION:	  PROPERTY	  RIGHTS	   IN	  THE	  WORLD	  OF	  IDEAS	  (2013).	  	   12.	  	   See	  MADHAVI	  SUNDER,	  FROM	  GOODS	  TO	  A	  GOOD	  LIFE	  (2012).	  	   13.	  	   BRETT	  M.	  FRISCHMANN,	  INFRASTRUCTURE:	  THE	  SOCIAL	  VALUE	  OF	  SHARED	  RESOURCES	  368	  (2012).	  	   14.	  	   Id.	  at	  367.	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willing	  to	  retain	  certain	  economic	  features	  in	  their	  theories,	  but	  both	  call	  for	  an	  ex-­‐pansion	   beyond	   the	   traditional	   disciplinary	   borders.	   Frischmann	   even	   concludes	  that	   the	   added	   complexity	   of	   moving	   to	   a	   more	   satisfying	   model	   of	   valuation	   is	  worth	   it,	   given	   that	   “the	   conventional	  models	   and	  measures	   obscure	   as	  much	   as	  they	  reveal.”15	  The	   three	  books	  all	  plainly	  draw,	   therefore,	  on	  some	  version	  of	  economic	  or	  utilitarian	  theories	  for	  allocating	  the	  rights	  and	  managing	  the	  resources	  associated	  with	  IP’s	  main	  currencies.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  just	  as	  plain	  from	  the	  three	  different	  approaches	  exemplified	   by	   these	   books	   that	   no	   consensus	   exists	   in	   the	   scholarly	   community	  about	  how	  to	  conceptualize	  intellectual	  property’s	  goals,	  tools,	  and	  structures.	  Evi-­‐dence	  of	  this	  diversity	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  fight	  over	  IP’s	  correct	  normative	  pur-­‐pose,	  vision	  and	  scope	  would—will—be	  protracted,	   there	  will	  be	  many	   interested	  stakeholders,	  employing	  various	  and	  different	  methods.	  The	  optimistic	  conclusion	  of	  this	  review	  is	  that	  this	  rich	  and	  conflicted	  heterogeneity	  should	  be	  a	  source	  not	  for	  complaint,	  but	  celebration.	  I.	  HYLTON	  AND	  CASS:	  INCENTIVES	  TO	  CREATE	  In	  certain	  respects,	  Laws	  of	  Creation	  is	  the	  most	  traditional	  of	  the	  three	  books	  selected	   for	   this	   review.	   Cass	   and	   Hylton’s	   book	   is	   an	   august	   and	   accessible	   re-­‐statement	   of	   the	   philosophical	   underpinnings	   of	   intellectual	   property	   law,	  with	   a	  pointed	   focus	   on	   utilitarian	   justifications	   brought	   over	   from	   property	   theory	   and	  law	  and	  economics.	  It	  displays	  a	  laudable	  command	  of	  a	  classic	  view	  of	  intellectual	  property	  resources	  and	  regulation,	  and	  an	   impressive	  range	   in	   its	   familiarity	  with	  all	  of	  the	  major	  doctrinal	  areas	  of	  IP.	  Its	  discussions	  of	  copyright	  doctrine	  occasion-­‐ally	  seem	  a	  bit	  hasty	  or	   imprecise—as	  when,	   for	   instance,	   the	  authors	  seem	  to	  be	  implying	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  idea	  and	  expression	  has	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  the	  work	  is	  great	  or	  ordinary,	  when	  instead	  the	  idea	  expression	  dichotomy	  simply	  separates	  what	  is	  protectable	  from	  what	  is	  not	  protected.16	  It	  is	  worth	  lingering	  on	  this	  detail	  since	  it	  plays	  a	  small	  but	  important	  recurring	  role	  in	  propping	  up	  the	  au-­‐thors’	  normative	  vision	  of	  copyright.	  To	  wit,	  they	  suggest,	  somewhat	  tautologically,	  that	  great	  works	  of	  art	  are	  superior	  for	  particular	  reasons	  that	  make	  the	  works’	  ap-­‐peal	  endure,	  and	  these	  appealing	  features	  in	  the	  works	  should	  be	  considered	  less	  as	  conditions	  for	  copyright	  protection	  and	  more	  as	  “features”	  which	  are	  appropriately	  “rewarded	  by	  unfettered	  access	  to	  copyright.”17	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  fact	  that	  works	  are	   great	   explains	   their	   protectability,	  which,	   in	   turn,	   supports	   the	   idea	   of	   strong	  protection.	  This	  view	  of	  copyright	   folds	   in	  many	  assumptions	  drawn	  from	  an	  eco-­‐nomic	  understanding	  of	  IP.	  In	  drawing	  on	  economic	  theories	  and	  literature,	  the	  book	  allies	  itself	  with	  one	  now-­‐established	  approach	  to	  intellectual	  property.	  According	  to	  that	  view,	  progress	  can	   be	   neatly	   categorized	   in	   terms	   of	   utilitarian	   advancements,	   such	   as	   improve-­‐
                                                            	   15.	  	   Id.	  	   16.	  	   CASS	  &	  HYLTON,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  101	  (“What	  distinguishes	  a	  Rembrandt	  or	  a	  Vermeer,	  a	  Sargent	  or	  a	  Manet,	  from	  the	  run-­‐of-­‐the-­‐mill	  artist	  isn’t	  the	  idea	  behind	  their	  paintings	  but	  the	  expression	  of	  it.”).	  At	  other	  times	  the	  authors	  seem	  to	  be	  similarly	  unsteady	  with	  respect	  to	  doctrinal	  nuances,	  as	  when	  they	  appear	  to	  confuse	  the	  originality	  requirement	  and	  the	  independent	  creation	  defense	  	  Id.	  at	  105.	  	   17.	  	   Id.	  at	  108.	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ments	   in	   medical	   care	   and	   hygiene,	   or	   improvements	   in	   communication	   directly	  traceable	   to	   better	   “speed,	   cost,	   and	   reliability.”18	   This	   approach	   to	   intellectual	  property	  often	  demonstrates	  a	  marked	  commitment	  to	  an	  incentives	  theory	  of	  intel-­‐lectual	   property,	   which	   is	   in	   evidence	   here,	   and	   which	   the	   authors	   naturalize	  through	  their	  frequent	  references	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  property	  rights	  as	  motivat-­‐ing	  factors	  for	  commercial	  investment.19	  Yet	   in	   its	   adherence	   to	   a	  particular	  party	   line,	  namely	   the	   incentives	   theory,	  the	  book	  feels	  in	  some	  crucial	  ways	  as	  though	  it	  has	  missed—perhaps	  even	  to	  some	  degree	   mischaracterized—an	   important	   recent	   chapter	   in	   intellectual	   property	  scholarship;	   one	   that	   reflects	   both	   increasing	   interdisciplinary	   methods	   and	  sources,	  and	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  turn	  away	  from	  utilitarianism.	  The	  turn	  away	  has	  not	  exactly	  been	  a	  turn	  to	  any	  one	  theory;	  we	  might	  call	  it	  a	  pluralistic	  turn,	  a	  turn	  to	  the	  possibilities	  of	  divergent	  and	  diverse	  views.	  Intellectual	  property	  scholarship	  can	  now	  safely	  be	  characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  sometimes-­‐competing	  ap-­‐proaches	  and	  views,	  with	  work	  drawing	  on	  empiricism,	  natural	  law	  and	  other	  phil-­‐osophical	   theories,	   and	   interdisciplinary	  methods	   hailing	   from	   psychology,	   litera-­‐ture,	   anthropology,	   music	   theory,	   and	   aesthetics.	   The	   field	   is	   as	   diverse	   as	   it	   is	  complex	  and	  specialized.	  Yet	  the	  academy,	  in	  the	  authors’	  depiction	  of	  it,	  seems	  car-­‐toonish,	   peopled	   with	   zealots	   who	   are,	   if	   recognizable,	   not	   representative	   of	   the	  academy	  at	  large.	  Cass	  and	  Hylton	  describe	  scholars	  who,	  in	  their	  estimation,	  think	  of	  IP	   law	  as	  “a	  zero-­‐sum	  conflict	  between	  rights-­‐holders	  and	  members	  of	  the	  pub-­‐lic,”20	   and	   they	   describe	   them	   as	   making	   “a	   broad-­‐based	   assault	   on	   fundamental	  propositions	  that	  support	  intellectual	  property.”21	  At	  the	  very	  moment	  when	  scholars	  have	  begun	  turning	  away	  from	  the	  incen-­‐tives	  theory	  in	  growing	  number,	  these	  authors	  seem	  to	  have	  doubled	  down	  on	  it,	  as	  though	   without	   adequately	   attending	   to	   the	   questions	   raised	   by	   their	   scholarly	  peers.	   Indeed,	   the	   book	   stacks	   the	   deck	   in	   numerous	   respects	   against	   competing	  views	  of	  intellectual	  property,	  as,	  for	  example,	  when	  it	  assumes	  that	  because	  copy-­‐ing	  technologies	  have	  improved,	  stronger	  protection	  must	  necessarily	  and	  logically	  be	  required.22	  The	  scholarship	  here	  is	  thoroughly	  researched,	  but	  dated,	  and	  some-­‐
                                                            	   18.	  	   Id.	  at	  1.	  	   19.	  	   For	  one	  example,	  see	   id.	  at	  3	  (noting	   that	   “[c]asual	  observers	  of	   the	  human	  condition	   long	  have	  noted	  the	  difference	  secure	  property	  rights	  make	  in	  motivating	  individual	  initiative.”).	  	  	   20.	  	   Id.	  at	  210.	  	  	   21.	  	   Id.	  at	  220.	  	   22.	  	   	  Id.	  at	  11	  (noting	  that	  “[t]he	  expected	  outcome	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  greater	  need	  for	  protection	  of	  the	  investment	  in	  creating	  and	  managing	  intellectual	  property.”).	  But	  cf.	  Elizabeth	  L.	  Rosenblatt,	  Intellectual	  
Property's	  Negative	  Space:	  Beyond	  the	  Utilitarian,	  40	  FLA.	  ST.	  U.	  L.	  REV.	  441,	  446	  (2013)	  (internal	  citations	  omitted):	   Courts	  and	  scholars	  have,	  generally	  speaking,	  advanced	  three	  non-­‐utilitarian	  justifi-­‐cations	   for	   intellectual	   property	   law:	   (1)	   labor-­‐desert	   theory,	   which	   originates	  loosely	   from	   John	   Locke's	   Two	   Treatises	   [sic]	   and	   posits	   that	   creators	   deserve	   to	  own	  the	  fruits	  of	  their	  intellectual	  labor;	  (2)	  personality	  theory,	  which	  extends	  from	  Hegel	  by	  way	  of	  Margaret	  Jane	  Radin	  and	  suggests	  that	  creators	  have	  a	  moral	  claim	  on	   their	   creations	  as	  an	  expression	  of	   their	  personalities;	   and	   (3)	  distributive	   jus-­‐tice,	   the	   idea	  that	   formal	   intellectual	  property	  rules	  should	  advance	  a	  “just	  and	  at-­‐tractive	  culture.”	  
Id.	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what	  complacent.23	  A	  generation	  of	  scholarship	  is	  represented	  around	  the	  2004	  and	  2005	  date,	  but	  genuinely	  recent	  or	  contemporary	  work	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  in	  their	  bibli-­‐ography	  Where	   it	   appears,	   it	  does	  not	   seem	   to	  merit	  more	   than	  passing	  mention:	  Jonathan	  M.	  Barnett’s	  empirical	  work	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  incentives	  thesis,	  for	  in-­‐stance,	  receives	  mention	  in	  a	  footnote,	  but	  its	  “balanced	  review”	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  its	  discussion	  in	  the	  text,	  where	  I	  believe	  its	  more	  complex	  balancing	  could	  have	  added	  strength	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  book’s	  arguments,	  if	  robustly	  deployed.24	  	  Because	  of	  the	  selective	  sources,	  the	  book’s	  arguments,	  at	  times,	  appear	  to	  ex-­‐ist	  within	  a	   scholarly	  echo	  chamber	  of	  primary	   (if	   concededly	  classic)	   sources.	  To	  use	  Adam	  Smith,	   for	   instance,	   to	   state	   that	   “there	  cannot	  be	  a	   strong	  case	  against	  property	   rules	   per	   se”	   is	   question-­‐begging.25	   More	   specifically,	   the	   authors	   claim	  that	  property	  rights	  have	  expanded	  over	  time,	  and	  take	  that	  expansion	  as	  evidence	  of	  Smith’s	  prescience.	  Yet	  earlier	  they	  refer	  to	  the	  “odd	  sort	  of	  disconnect	  in	  the	  ris-­‐ing	  number	  of	  voices	   in	  opposition	  to	   intellectual	  property	  rights”	  and	  seem	  to	   ig-­‐nore	  the	  point	  their	  own	  observations	  raises.26	  To	  say	  that	  property	  rights	  have	  ex-­‐panded	   over	   time	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   such	   expansion	   was	   either	   necessary	   or	  inevitable.	  Indeed,	  the	  wave	  of	  criticism	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  could	  surely	  be	  graphed	  in	  some	  meaningful	  way	  as	  a	  function	  of	  their	  very	  expansion.	  The	  voic-­‐es	   raised	   in	  opposition	  are	  not,	   after	  all,	   unreasonable	  proponents	  of	   some	  quasi-­‐Marxist	   view,	   hostile	   to	   capitalistic	   notions	   of	   private	   property;	   many	   of	   these	  scholars	  have	  worked	  for	  private	  employers	  for	  profit,	  and	  some	  continue	  to	  do	  so	  even	  as	  they	  teach	  in	  law	  schools.	  Undergirding	  their	  preference	  for	  a	  more	  limited	  scope	  of	   intellectual	  property	   rights	  might	  be	  historical	  or	  doctrinal	   grounds;	   cul-­‐tural	   and	   artistic	   justifications;	   and,	   indeed,	   economic	   theories.	   These	   are	   not,	   in	  other	  words,	  IP	  Bolsheviks,	  crying	  for	  a	  radical	  revolution,	  as	  much	  as	  they	  are	  care-­‐ful	  scholars	  attending	   to	  what	  has	  unquestionably	   (and	  descriptively)	  been	  an	  ex-­‐panding	  sphere	  of	  rights,	  even	  by	  Cass	  and	  Hylton’s	  admission.	  Cass	  and	  Hylton’s	  normative	  commitment	  to	  one	  vision—an	  economic	  vision	  propped	  up	  by	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis—may	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  of	  a	  more	  robustly	  de-­‐fended	   book.	   By	   way	   of	   example,	   consider	   that	   the	   authors	   seem	   to	   trivialize	   all	  non-­‐utilitarian	   forms	  of	   attention	   to	   legal	   problem	  solving	   thus:	   “Intuitively,	  most	  people	   thinking	   seriously	   about	   legal	   rules	   gravitate	   to	   some	   form	  of	   cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.”27	   This	   quote	   suggests	   that	   any	   sort	   of	   reasoning	   about	   legal	   rules	   from	  philosophical	  first	  principles,	  whether	  Kantian	  or,	  indeed,	  Lockean,	  let	  alone	  moral	  balancing	  in	  the	  natural	  law	  tradition,	  must	  necessarily	  constitute	  pursuits	  lacking	  in	   sufficient	   seriousness	   to	   satisfy	  Cass	  and	  Hylton,	   if	   that	   reasoning	   falls	   short	  of	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis.	  The	   time-­‐bounded	  nature	   of	   the	   book	  becomes	   all	   the	  more	   apparent	  when	  
                                                            	   23.	  	   I	  hesitate	  to	  brand	  anything	  as	  dated,	  especially	  a	  book	  of	  scholarship	  by	  such	  obviously	  preemi-­‐nent	   thinkers.	   However,	   loose	   empirical	   evidence	   supports	   the	   assertion.	   Examination	   of	   the	   main	  sources	  underpinning	  the	  authors’	  key	  arguments	  reveals	  that	  a	  good	  many	  of	  their	  sources	  date	  to	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  or	  earlier.	  	   24.	  	   CASS	  &	  HYLTON,	  supra	  note	  11,	  at	  230	  n.11.	  	   25.	  	   Id.	  at	  16.	  	  	   26.	  	   Id.	  at	  10.	  	  	   27.	  	   Id.	  at	  31.	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the	  authors	  turn	  their	  focus	  from	  philosophy	  to	  intellectual	  property.	  Their	  view	  of	  the	  works	  of	   intellectual	  property	   is	  almost	  entirely	  consumption-­‐oriented:	   “Writ-­‐ers,	  producers,	  singers,	  actors,	  and	  others	  devote	  their	  talents	  to	  creating	  books	  and	  films	  and	  music	  for	  us	  to	  enjoy.”28	  Moreover,	  they	  make	  continuing	  causal	  claims	  for	  which	  they	  lack	  the	  sort	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  they	  theoretically	  prize.	  For	  instance,	  they	  state	  that,	  “investment	  in	  research	  and	  development	  has	  been	  driven	  in	  large	  part	   by	   the	   ability	   to	   secure	  profits	   through	   a	   legally	   protected	  patent,	   copyright,	  trademark,	  or	  trade	  secret.”29	  Though	  they	  concede	  that	  commercial	   incentives	  of-­‐fered	  by	  the	  promise	  of	  legal	  protection	  are	  “not	  the	  only	  reason	  for”	  invention	  and	  creation,	   they	  nonetheless	   insist—without	  offering	  evidence	   for	   the	  proposition—that	  such	  protection	  “is	  often	  a	  principal	  motivating	  force	  or	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  activity	  essential	  to	  innovation	  and	  creation.”30	  They	  offer	  none	  of	  the	  coun-­‐ternarratives	  to	  the	  necessary-­‐as-­‐incentive	  fable	  they	  offer,	  ultimately,	  in	  my	  view,	  weakening	  their	  argument.	  Perhaps	  Cass	   and	  Hylton’s	  work	  more	  accurately	   captures	  patent	   law’s	   con-­‐tours,	  and	  better	  reflects	  the	  state	  of	  contemporary	  scholarship	  on	  patents.	  My	  fa-­‐miliarity	   with	   patent	   law	   and	   scholarship	   is	   limited.	   Accordingly,	   I	   cannot	   fully	  claim	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  book	  is	  germane	  and	  current	  to	  the	  scholarly	  dialogue	   in	  that	  area.	  However,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  other	  areas	  this	  book	  covers,	   I	  would	  report	  a	  regrettable	  gap	  between	  the	  book	  and	  the	  dynamic	  critical	  conver-­‐sation	  as	  it	  is	  occurring	  in	  the	  field:	  in	  law	  reviews,	  books,	  peer-­‐reviewed	  journals,	  symposia,	  and	  so	  on.	  We	  need	  look	  no	  further	  than	  the	  other	  two	  books	  selected	  for	  review	  for	  examples	  of	  what	  I	  mean.	  II.	  SUNDER:	  IP	  AND	  GLOBAL	  JUSTICE	  Madhavi	  Sunder’s	  new	  book,	  From	  Goods	  to	  a	  Good	  Life,	  offers	  a	  reframing	  of	  IP	  law	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  capacity	  to	  increase	  “human	  capabilities,”	  as	  that	  approach	  has	  been	  articulated	  by	  Amartya	  Sen	  and	  Martha	  Nussbaum.	  Sunder	   seeks	   to	   reframe	  intellectual	  property	  law	  in	  “complex	  consequentialist”	  terms	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  global	  so-­‐cial	  justice,	  which	  in	  turn	  requires	  redefining	  how	  the	  law	  conceptualizes	  culture.31	  She	  shows	  that	  whether	  law	  treats	  culture	  as	  tradition,	  as	  commodity,	  or	  as	  partici-­‐patory	  sphere	  makes	  a	  significant	  difference	  in	  law’s	  influence	  in	  human	  lives.	  Sun-­‐der’s	  title	  thus	  reflects	  her	  mission:	  to	  move	  IP	  law	  from	  its	  role	  in	  regulating	  goods	  to	  a	  broader	  role	  in	  maximizing	  human	  flourishing.	  I	  participated	  in	  an	  online	  sym-­‐posium	  for	   the	  blog	  Concurring	  Opinions,	   in	  which	   I	  described	   the	  work	   thus:	  We	  might	  say	  that	  rather	  than	  “efficiency,	  utility,	  and	  output	  by	  the	  few	  for	  consumption	  
by	  the	  many,	  a	  word	  cloud	  for	  Sunder’s	  normative	  vision	  [of	  IP]	  would	  instead	  fea-­‐ture	  justice,	  human	  flourishing,	  and	  participation	  by	  the	  many	  for	  the	  many.”32	  As	  is	  perhaps	  appropriate	  for	  a	  book	  with	  such	  ambitious	  scope,	  Sunder’s	  pro-­‐
                                                            	   28.	  	   Id.	  at	  32.	  	  	   29.	  	   Id.	  at	  35.	  	   30.	  	   Id.	  at	  35,	  36.	  	   31.	  	   SUNDER,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  15.	  	   32.	  	   Zahr	  Said,	  A	  Response	  to	  Madhavi	  Sunder’s	  From	  Goods	  to	  a	  Good	  Life,	  CONCURRING	  OPINIONS	  (Sept.	  11,	   2012),	   http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2012/09/a-­‐response-­‐to-­‐madhavi-­‐sunders-­‐from-­‐goods-­‐to-­‐a-­‐good-­‐life.html.	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ject	  covers	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  theoretical	  and	  doctrinal	  ground.	  Sunder’s	  chapters	  range	  from	  discussing	  the	  broad	  cultural	  and	  political	  theories	  that	  buttress	  her	  argument	  to	  tackling	  the	  specific	  challenges	  presented	  by	  copyright	  law	  and	  forms	  of	  appro-­‐priation	   such	   as	   remix	   culture	   and	   cultural	   appropriation;	   trademark	   law	   and	   its	  use	  in	  developing	  countries	  as	  a	  means	  of	  equalizing	  trading	  power;	  and	  patent	  law	  and	   biodiversity	   issues.	   Sunder	   turns	   for	   her	   theoretical	   tools	   to	   cultural	   studies	  and	  the	  social	  sciences,	  finding	  helpful	  voices	  in	  anthropology,	  art	  and	  music	  histo-­‐ry,	  philosophy,	  political	  science,	  and	  psychology.	  A	  signal	  and	  deliberate	  omission	  in	  Sunder’s	  citation	  roll	  comes	  in	  her	  circumscription	  of	  the	  dominant	  economic	  voices	  in	  IP	  scholarship,	  whose	  considerable	  influence	  Sunder	  sees	  as	  having	  derailed	  the	  larger	  potential	  of	  IP	  law	  to	  do	  good	  in	  the	  world.	  Though	  naturally	  she	  gestures	  to	  law	  and	  economics—it	  would	  be	  almost	  impossible	  not	  to	  do	  so	  in	  a	  project	  of	  this	  sort—Sunder	  prefers	  to	  locate	  her	  authority	  elsewhere.	  Indeed,	  Sunder	  stresses	  the	  need	  to	  unsettle	  the	  hegemony	  of	  economic	  approaches	  to	  IP,	  which	  she	  feels	  have	  produced	   “a	   crabbed	   understanding	   of	   culture	   and	   law’s	   role	   in	   promoting	   cul-­‐ture.”33	  In	  consequence,	  IP	  law	  has	  been	  marshaled	  for	  the	  ultimately	  materialistic	  and	  superficial	  purpose	  of	  augmenting	  “the	  production	  of	  more	  cultural	  goods”	  in-­‐stead	   of	   tapping	   the	   law’s	   capacity	   “fundamentally	   [to]	   affect	   human	   capabilities”	  and	   provide	   in	   a	  more	   universal	   fashion	   the	   ability	   “to	   live	  a	   good	   life.”34	   Yet	   far	  from	   playing	   a	   minor	   role	   in	   everyday	   life,	   IP’s	   presence	   and	   power	   in	   Sunder’s	  characterization	  are	  at	  an	  all-­‐time	  high.35	  Sunder	  is	  thus	  adamant	  that	  a	  new	  theori-­‐zation	  needs	  to	  be	  developed,	  and	  she	  offers	  a	  set	  of	  factors	  we	  might	  consider.	  Cru-­‐cially,	   in	  her	  critique	  of	   the	  existing	  economic	   framework,	   she	  does	  not	  propose	  a	  complete	   rejection	   of	   economics;	   she	   seeks	   instead	   to	   broaden	   the	   economic	  framework,	  to	  allow	  inclusion	  of	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  values.	  I	  should	  note	  that	  just	  as	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  Cass	  and	  Hylton	  a	  bit	  uncharita-­‐bly	  present	  the	  state	  of	  contemporary	  scholarship	  as	  a	  field	  filled	  with	  one	  (unrea-­‐sonable)	  view,	  it	  seems	  that	  Sunder’s	  view	  of	  IP’s	  law-­‐and-­‐economics	  school	  is	  simi-­‐larly,	  though	  unintentionally,	  uncharitable.	  Take,	  for	  instance,	  when	  she	  offers	  this	  reductionist	  view	  of	  the	  contemporary	  academy:	  “[IP]	  scholars	  today	  focus	  on	  a	  sin-­‐gle	  goal:	  efficiency.”36	   I	  would	  further	  venture	  that	  she	  overstates	  the	  centrality	  of	  economic	  discourse	  to	  the	  academy	  (“The	  dominance	  of	  this	  singular,	  narrow	  eco-­‐nomic	   discourse	   has	   rarely	   been	   challenged”),37	   especially	   since	   she	   is	   quick	   to	  acknowledge	  that	  outside	  the	  academy,	  its	  influence	  has	  been	  less	  certain.38	  Sunder	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  on	  strongest	  ground	  when	  she	  offers	  competing	  narratives	  that	  leave	  room	  to	   integrate	  sophisticated	  economic	  ones	  as	  well,	   rather	   than	   insisting	  
                                                            	   33.	  	   SUNDER,	  supra	  note	  12,	  at	  3.	  	   34.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	  	   35.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	  	   36.	  	   Id.	  at	  11.	  She	  softens	  this	  stance	  somewhat	  later,	  but	  remains	  fairly	  committed	  to	  the	  view	  that	  the	  incentive-­‐focus	   to	   the	   utilitarian	   story	   is	   limiting,	   rather	   than	   clarifying:	   “I	   urge	   intellectual	   property	  scholars	  to	  begin	  to	   integrate	  [economic	  and	  cultural	   lenses]	  and	  come	  to	  recognize	  that	   the	   interrela-­‐tionship	  between	  culture	  and	  economics	  goes	  well	  beyond	  incentives.”	  Id.	  at	  44.	  	   37.	  	   Id.	  at	  25.	  	   38.	  	   	  Id.	   at	   29	   (noting	   that	   “despite	   its	   preeminent	   position	   in	   legal	   scholarship,	   the	   narrow	   under-­‐standing	  of	  intellectual	  property	  as	  incentives	  is	  not,	  in	  fact	  driving	  the	  most	  important	  legal	  decisions	  in	  the	  field.”).	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there	  is	  a	  single	  narrative	  against	  which	  everything	  needs	  to	  exist	  in	  oppositional	  or	  even	  dialectical	  response.	  In	   most	   respects,	   I	   confess	   a	   natural—or	   professionally	   naturalized—inclination	  to	  adopt	  much	  of	  what	  Sunder	  suggests	  in	  both	  her	  descriptive	  and	  pre-­‐scriptive	  assessments	  of	   IP	   law.	   Indeed,	   I	  admitted	  as	  much	  when	  I	  blogged	  about	  this	  book	  previously.39	  Ultimately	  though,	  however	  much	  in	  sympathy	  I	  find	  myself	  to	   Sunder’s	  work	   in	   general	   and	   this	   book	   in	   particular,	   I	   am	  not	   fully	   convinced	  that	  all	  of	  the	  many	  issues	  and	  doctrinal	  subject	  areas	  are	  equally	  well	  served	  by	  her	  human	   capabilities	   approach.	   Nor	   am	   I	   clear	   on	   how	   the	   book’s	   considerable	   in-­‐sights	  can	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  IP	  so	  as	  to	  make	  an	  effective	  legal	  impact.	  On	  the	  one	   hand,	   the	   book	   could	   thus	   be	   said	   to	   understate	   the	   magnitude	   of	   the	   (im-­‐portant,	   and	   in	   my	   view	   welcome)	   reorientation	   Sunder	   proposes.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	  the	  book	  could	  be	  said	  to	  have	  stimulated	  demand	  for	  a	  sequel	  in	  which	  Sun-­‐der	  tells	  us	  more	  about	  a	  topic	  urgently	  in	  need	  of	  further	  work:	  how	  to	  make	  IP	  a	  tool	   for	   global	   justice,	   rather	   than	   a	  weapon	  of	   global	   imperialism	  and	   inequity.	   I	  echo	   a	   phrase	   here	   that	   Sunder	   uses	   to	   great	   effect	   in	   the	   book:	   “Every	   tool	   is	   a	  weapon	  if	  you	  hold	  it	  right.”40	  Sunder’s	  framing	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  consequentialist	  distinction	  between	  IP	  laws	  as	  tools	  and	  IP	  laws	  as	  weapons,	  and	  it	  contains	  hints	  of	  how	  powerful	  they	  can	  be	  when	  used,	  or	  deployed.	  III.	  FRISCHMANN:	  INFRASTRUCTURES	  IN	  CULTURAL	  WORKS	  AND	  RESOURCES	  Frischmann’s	  book,	  Infrastructure:	  The	  Social	  Value	  of	  Shared	  Resources,	  offers	  a	  demand-­‐side	  theory	  of	   infrastructure	  and	  commons	  management,	   looking	  at	   the	  underexamined	   microeconomic	   dimensions	   of	   these	   resources.	   Drawing	   on	   two	  complex	  scholarly	  concepts,	  the	  infrastructure	  and	  the	  commons,	  that	  have	  not	  tra-­‐ditionally	   been	   in	   dialogue,	   Frischmann	   illustrates	   the	   value	   of	   pivoting	   carefully	  from	  one	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  a	  set	  of	  problems	  to	  another.	  The	  modalities	  inform	  each	  other	  helpfully,	  and	  in	  my	  view,	  persuasively.	  Extraordinarily	  learned,	  the	  book	  dis-­‐plays	  masterful	  command	  of	  multiple	  fields	  of	  knowledge	  and	  areas	  of	  law,	  and	  con-­‐sistent	  agility	  in	  navigating	  those	  fields	  and	  areas.	  In	   a	   chapter	  dedicated	   to	   intellectual	   infrastructure,	   Frischmann	   shows	  how	  infrastructure	   theories	   can	   teach	   us	   important	   commonalities	   across	   a	   group	   of	  otherwise	   unrelated	   things,	   such	   as	   “road	   systems,	   telephone	   networks,	   ecosys-­‐tems,	  and	  ideas.”41	  He	  also	  suggests	  the	  urgency	  of	  attending	  to	  doctrinal	  limitations	  in	   IP—such	   as	   the	   idea/expression	   doctrine	   in	   copyright	   law,	   which	   Frischmann	  
                                                            	   39.	   Said,	  supra	  note	  32:	  I	  am	  entirely	  in	  sympathy	  with	  Sunder’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  need	  to	  incorporate,	  to-­‐gether	   with	   the	   economic	   metanarrative	   of	   IP,	   competing	   metanarratives	   whose	  broader	  and	  different	  implications	  ought	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  prioritize	  values	  other	  than	  those	  outlined	  by	  the	  law-­‐and-­‐economics	  agenda.	  I	  share	  Sunder’s	  vision	  of	  the	  im-­‐portance	  of	  facilitating	  cultural	  participation	  and	  equalizing	  gross	  trade	  imbalances,	  such	  as	  those	  that	  defined	  an	  illustrative	  and,	  in	  many	  ways,	  very	  disturbing	  dispute	  between	   Starbucks	   and	   Ethiopian	   coffee	   farmers	   (pp.	   40-­‐43).	   Finally,	   I	   celebrate	  Sunder’s	  interdisciplinary	  approach	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  	   40.	  	   SUNDER,	   supra	   note	   12,	   at	   144	   (citing	   Jennifer	   Allen,	   Superflex:	   Rooseum—Reviews:	   Amsterdam,	  Bjornstjerne	   Reuter	   Christiansen,	   Jackob	   Fenger	   &	   Rasmus	   Nielsen,	   ART	   FORUM	   (Feb.	   2003),	  http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-­‐mo268/is_6_41/ai_98123170.)	  	   41.	  	   FRISCHMANN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  xiii.	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would	   import	   to	  patent.	  Because	   ideas	   form	  such	  a	   crucial	  part	  of	   the	   intellectual	  infrastructure	   Frischmann	   conceptualizes,	   it	   becomes	   clearer	   why	   limiting	   doc-­‐trines	  matter,	  and	  why	  sharpening,	  even	  rigidifying,	  them	  will	  curb	  IP’s	  expansion-­‐ist	  tendencies.	  Frischmann’s	  vision	  overlaps	  with	  Sunder’s	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  both	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  cultural	  environment	  (or	  participatory	  culture)	  for	  shaping	  crea-­‐tive	   output.42	  What	   is	  more,	   both	   scholars	   emphasize	   the	   relational	   nature	   of	   the	  cultural	  environment,	  thus	  downplaying	  historically	  contingent	  notions	  of	  individu-­‐al	   or	   Romantic	   authorship	   isolated	   from	   context	   and	   community.43	   Participatory	  culture	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   both	   authors’	   normative	   visions	   of	   creativity,	   and	   this	  marks	  a	  strong	  divide	  between	  the	  books	  of	  Frischmann	  and	  Sunder,	  versus	  that	  of	  Cass	  and	  Hylton.	  Because	  this	  participatory	  view	  of	  IP	  does	  not	  depend	  for	  its	  justi-­‐fication	  on	  the	  incentives	  theory,	  it	  tends	  to	  downplay	  or	  displace	  it.	  A	  charming	  in-­‐stantiation	   of	   that	   displacement	   comes	   in	   Frischmann’s	   relegation	   to	   a	   very	   long	  footnote	  a	  meticulous	  clarification	  (and	  delimitation)	  of	   the	  scope	  of	   the	   incentive	  theory.44	  Many	  important	  insights	  follow	  from	  the	  emphasis	  on	  IP	  as	  participatory.	  To	  highlight	  one,	  Frischmann	  shows	  that	  “[i]ntellectual	  resources	  often	  have	  a	  dual	  na-­‐ture—creation,	  invention,	  and	  innovation	  may	  be	  [both]	  resources	  and	  activities.”45	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  insisting	  on	  the	  property-­‐like	  characteristics	  inherent	  in	  some	  IP,	  which	  orient	  us	  toward	  questions	  of	  ownership	  and	  consumption,	  the	  participatory	  framing	  orients	  us	  toward	  notions	  of	  sharing,	  access,	  infrastructural	  support,	  and	  so	  on.	  It	  starts,	  as	  the	  best	  revisionisms	  do,	  from	  a	  small	  place,	  and	  expands	  to	  exert	  a	  potentially	   very	   powerful	   impact.	   Frischmann’s	   book	   situates	   itself	   carefully	   and	  dynamically	   in	  contemporary	  scholarship,	  and	  addresses	   itself	   to	  pressing	  current	  concerns.	  At	  the	  book’s	  conclusion,	  Frischmann	  offers	  a	   list	  of	  ongoing	  debates	  for	  fur-­‐ther	  consideration,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Google	  Books.	  He	  writes	  that	  “Google	  Books	  is	  a	  mixed	  infrastructure	  with	  substantial	  spillover	  potential	  associated	  with	  dramatically	  improved	  public	  access	  to	  millions	  of	  books	  and	  the	  ideas,	  knowledge,	  stories,	  and	  so	  on	  contained	  in	  them.”46	  To	  frame	  Google	  Books	  as	  an	  infrastructure	  is	  already	  a	  novel	  contribution.	  But	  Frischmann	  goes	  further	  when	  he	  puts	  into	  play	  the	  series	  of	  questions	  that	  would	  flow	  from	  nondiscriminatory	  access	  of	   the	  kind	  to	   which	   Google	   aspired.	   For	   example,	   both	   Google,	   and,	   to	   some	   extent,	   Frisch-­‐mann,	  downplay	  the	  objections	  of	  copyright	  owners	  who	  did	  not	  wish	  to	  be	  includ-­‐ed.47	  A	  question	  with	  which	  I	  was	  left	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  value	  of	  the	  infra-­‐structure	   should,	   normatively,	   outweigh	   not	   just	   individual	   author	   rights,	   but	   the	  rights	  of	  whole	  classes	  of	  authors	  (which	  were	  at	  issue	  in	  the	  Google	  Books	  Settle-­‐
                                                            	   42.	  	   Id.	  at	  257.	  	  	  	   43.	  	   Id.	  at	  258.	  	   44.	  	   Id.	  at	  267	  n.44.	  	   45.	  	   Id.	  at	  270.	  	   46.	  	   Id.	  at	  360.	  	   47.	  	   But	  note	   that	  Frischmann	  mentions	   that	  Google	  did	  not	  secure	  permission	   from	  owners	  and,	   in	  fact,	   “[f]lipp[ed]	   the	  default”	   in	   terms	  of	  seeking	  permission	   from	  copyright	  owners,	  who	  would	  other-­‐wise	  have	  had	  to	  opt	  into	  Google’s	  infrastructure,	  thus	  raising	  the	  costs	  of	  establishing	  it.	  Id.	  at	  359.	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ment,	  when	   it	  was	   first	   rejected;	   recently,	   Judge	  Chin	   found	   that	  Google’s	   copying	  was	  not	  infringing	  because	  it	  constituted	  fair	  use).48	  Frischmann	   has	   done	   an	   immense	   service	   by	   laying	   out	   in	   a	   dispassionate	  manner	  a	  set	  of	  tools	  for	  thinking	  about	  non-­‐rivalrous,	  though	  at	  times	  congestible,	  resources,	  including	  intellectual	  property.	  Though	  his	  conclusions	  point	  in	  a	  norma-­‐tive	   direction—towards	   non-­‐discrimination—his	   methods	   cannot	   be	   faulted	   for	  their	  lack	  of	  rigor,	  or	  for	  their	  partiality.49	  Yet	  how	  far	  we	  ought	  to	  go	  in	  using	  those	  tools,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  their	  use	  can	  be	  justified,	  in	  the	  service	  of	  an	  ideal	  of	  non-­‐discrimination,	  are	  not	  questions	  the	  book	  decides	  to	  an-­‐swer.	   Frischmann	   warns	   us	   that	   “[s]ocial	   goods	   involve	   inescapable	   demand-­‐manifestation	   problems”	   that	   require	   difficult	   determinations	   about	   both	   “what	  types	   of	   infrastructure	   are	   essential	   for	   [the]	   production”50	   of	   these	   social	   goods,	  and	  who	  will	   foot	   the	   bill	   for	   creating	   and	  maintaining	   their	   infrastructure,	   given	  what	   he—cautiously—terms	   “infrastructure	   effects.”51	   Frischmann	   intentionally	  leaves	  these	  questions	  unanswered.	  Hence,	  this	  is	  less	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  chosen	  scope	  of	  his	  project	   than	  a	   strong	  expression	  of	   interest	   in	   the	  balancing	   that	   the	  use	  of	  Frischmann’s	  conceptual	  tools	  inevitably	  invites.	  IV.	  CONCLUSION	  This	  trio	  of	  books	  gives	  cause	  for	  celebration	  because	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  possi-­‐ble	   perspectives	   and	  methodological	   tools	   on	   display.	   That	   complementary—and	  often	   contradictory—approaches	  may	   not	   simply	   appear,	   but	   thrive,	   suggests	   the	  richness	  that	  characterizes	  IP	  scholarship	  today.	  The	  books	  will	  naturally	  appeal	  to	  different	   readers	   for	   different	   reasons,	   yet	   it	   could	   be	   said	   that	   even	   seasoned	  scholars	  will	  learn	  something	  from	  each	  of	  the	  works.	  	  
                                                            	   48.	  	   Authors	  Guild,	  Inc.	  v.	  Google,	  Inc.,	  05	  Civ.	  8136	  DC,	  2013	  WL	  6017130	  (S.D.N.Y.	  Nov.	  14,	  2013).	  	  	   49.	  	   Infrastructure	  resources	  should	  be	  shared	  “in	  an	  open,	  nondiscriminatory	  manner	  when	  it	  is	  fea-­‐sible	  to	  do	  so,”	  Frischmann	  notes,	  both	  for	  fairness	  and	  efficiency	  purposes.	  FRISCHMANN,	  supra	  note	  13,	  at	  xiii.	  “The	  social	  value	  attributable	  to	  a	  mixed	  Internet	  infrastructure	  is	  immense	  even	  if	  immeasurable.”	  
Id.	  at	  357.	  	   50.	  	   Id.	  at	  71.	  	   51.	  	   Id.	  at	  89.	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